



AGRINFO

DEFORESTATION PRODUCTS

OVERVIEW OF COUNTRIES
AFFECTED BY REGULATORY
CHANGE

AFRICA

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1. INTRODUCTION

The European Union's Regulation (EU) [2023/1115](#) on deforestation-free products is expected to have a significant impact on suppliers as they seek to address new requirements aimed at ending the EU's contribution to deforestation through consumption of agricultural products. This transition creates challenges worldwide, particularly in Africa where the production of affected products for the EU market represents a significant proportion of revenue from agricultural trade, and is central to the livelihoods of millions of people.

The extent to which sectors in different countries will have to adjust to the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR) will depend on the organisation of the sector (the complexity and fragmentation of the supply chain); technical and institutional capacity; the existing traceability and certification schemes; and the level of public-private dialogue and cooperation. Understanding the particular challenges and needs of an individual country or sector requires a detailed case-by-case assessment.

However, it is helpful to build an overall picture of which countries and which sectors may be particularly affected by the EUDR. This short report highlights those countries and value chains viewed to be most sensitive to EU policy change in general – it does not take into account the specific requirements of the EUDR – drawing on a methodology developed for the implementation of the [AGRINFO](#) programme. This methodology (set out in Annex I) aims to place agricultural exports to the EU market in a broader economic and developmental context.

The scope of AGRINFO is agri-food products, and the importance of the agri-food sector is central to the methodology developed. The non-agri-food deforestation products (most notably timber and rubber) that are included within the scope of the EUDR cannot be incorporated into this methodology in a way that allows a direct comparison. Nevertheless, data on these markets is included in this report and some points of comparison are provided in a way that we hope contributes to the overall picture.



Summary

- Under the methodology developed in this report, the 10 countries and sectors identified as being likely to be the most affected by changes to EU rules (including the EUDR) are: **Côte d'Ivoire** (cocoa), **São Tomé and Príncipe** (cocoa), **Burundi** (coffee), **Cameroon** (cocoa), **Sierra Leone** (cocoa), **Ethiopia** (coffee), **Uganda** (coffee), **São Tomé and Príncipe** (palm oil), **Ghana** (cocoa), and **Liberia** (cocoa).
- On average, 37% of Africa's agrifood deforestation product exports (in volume) are destined for the EU market. The most dependent sector on the EU market is cocoa (53% of global exports) followed by coffee (46%).
- In many countries, over 50% of global exports in certain deforestation products are currently exported to the EU. In cocoa, this is the case for Cameroon, Liberia, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, and Togo. Over 50% of Burundi and Uganda coffee exports and São Tomé and Príncipe's palm oil exports are destined for the EU.
- Of the seven EUDR deforestation products exported from Africa to the EU, cocoa is the largest in export value (58% of the total of deforestation product exports), followed by timber (16%), coffee (12%), and rubber (9%).
- Among deforestation products, the EU is most dependent upon African countries as a source of cocoa (77% of imports sourced from Africa), followed by coffee (14%) and rubber (10%).
- The overall economic importance of exports of deforestation products can be highly significant. Côte d'Ivoire's exports revenue from these products is equivalent to 5.7% of the country's GDP. For Liberia and São Tomé and Príncipe, exports represent 2.9% of GDP and 2% for Cameroon.



2. THE DEFORESTATION PRODUCTS MOST AFFECTED BY EU REGULATORY CHANGE

The EUDR covers seven product sectors that have both food and non-food applications. In this report, the products from all seven sectors are referred to for simplicity as “deforestation products”. A distinction is then made between those destined for the food chain – “agri-food deforestation products” – and “non-agri-food deforestation products”.

2.1. Africa’s exports of deforestation products


Africa exports both agri-food and non-agri-food deforestation products, with certain sectors falling into both categories. Of these, palm oil is almost exclusively food oriented, whereas cattle-related products are largely non-agri-food (see Table 1).

Table 1: Africa’s exports of deforestation products to the EU: percentage share destined for agri-food and non-agri-food uses. Source: COLEAD based on Eurostat.

| Sector | % Agri-food | % Non-agri-food |
|----------|-------------|-----------------|
| Cattle | 11.5 | 88.5 |
| Cocoa | 100 | 0 |
| Coffee | 100 | 0 |
| Palm oil | 99.9 | 0.1 |
| Rubber | 0 | 100 |
| Soya | 100 | 0 |
| Timber | 0 | 100 |

Cocoa is the main deforestation product exported from Africa, representing 44% in volume and 58% in value of all deforestation product exports. Cocoa is followed by timber and rubber (see Figure 1), although timber’s significance is considerably less in value terms (16% of all African deforestation product exports) than in volume (28%).

Figure 1: Share of each deforestation category on the deforestation products exported from Africa to the EU27, 2020–2022 average, in volume and value. Source: COLEAD based on Eurostat





With the exception of timber, African deforestation product exports in each sector are typically dominated by a single country (see Table 2). Most notable in this respect is Côte d'Ivoire, which exports 65 and 57% of Africa's trade with the EU in rubber and cocoa, respectively. The timber sector is far more diversified, with Cameroon, the largest exporter, taking a 20% share of all African timber exports.

Table 2: Largest exporters of each deforestation product to the EU27 by volume (2020–2022 average) and their respective share of the African export market. Source: COLEAD based on Eurostat

| Cattle | | | Cocoa | | | Coffee | | |
|----------------------------------|---|--|----------------------------------|---|--|----------------------------------|---|--|
| Country | Top five African exporters to EU (tonnes) | Share of total African exports to EU (%) | Country | Top five African exporters to EU (tonnes) | Share of total African exports to EU (%) | Country | Top five African exporters to EU (tonnes) | Share of total African exports to EU (%) |
| South Africa | 10,499 | 40.8 | Côte d'Ivoire | 1,135,669 | 56.5 | Uganda | 197,606 | 49.3 |
| Kenya | 4,873 | 19.0 | Ghana | 386,664 | 19.2 | Ethiopia | 84,608 | 21.1 |
| Namibia | 2,961 | 11.5 | Cameroon | 217,629 | 10.8 | Tanzania | 35,439 | 8.8 |
| Egypt | 2,043 | 7.9 | Nigeria | 176,650 | 8.8 | Kenya | 20,175 | 5.0 |
| Morocco | 1,785 | 6.9 | Sierra Leone | 17,184 | 0.9 | Côte d'Ivoire | 17,424 | 4.3 |
| Total exports from Africa | 25,713 | | Total exports from Africa | 2,010,767 | | Total exports from Africa | 401,163 | |

| Palm oil | | | Rubber | | | Soy | | |
|----------------------------------|---|--|----------------------------------|---|--|----------------------------------|---|--|
| Country | Top five African exporters to EU (tonnes) | Share of total African exports to EU (%) | Country | Top five African exporters to EU (tonnes) | Share of total African exports to EU (%) | Country | Top five African exporters to EU (tonnes) | Share of total African exports to EU (%) |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 71,529 | 43.9 | Côte d'Ivoire | 286,820 | 64.9 | Nigeria | 125,899 | 51.1 |
| Gabon | 35,536 | 21.8 | Nigeria | 26,864 | 6.1 | Togo | 78,846 | 32.0 |
| Liberia | 22,261 | 13.7 | Liberia | 26,708 | 6.0 | Egypt | 11,499 | 4.7 |
| Ghana | 15,564 | 9.6 | Ghana | 23,897 | 5.4 | Benin | 8,844 | 3.6 |
| Sierra Leone | 5,020 | 3.1 | Cameroon | 21,242 | 4.8 | Ethiopia | 7,524 | 3.1 |
| Total exports from Africa | 162,922 | | Total exports from Africa | 441,626 | | Total exports from Africa | 246,305 | |

| Timber | | |
|----------------------------------|---|--|
| Country | Top five African exporters to EU (tonnes) | Share of total African exports to EU (%) |
| Cameroon | 263,851 | 20.5 |
| Gabon | 235,444 | 18.3 |
| South Africa | 189,086 | 14.7 |
| Congo | 101,254 | 7.9 |
| Namibia | 95,357 | 7.4 |
| Total exports from Africa | 1,288,918 | |



2.2. Which deforestation products/countries may be most affected by the EUDR?

The Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) methodology developed by the AGRINFO programme (see Annex I) identifies those countries and sectors that may potentially be most affected by changes to EU regulations, in this instance the EUDR. It moves the focus away from the quantity of trade, highlighted in Section 2.1, towards the significance of that trade in the local context, considering each country's reliance on the EU market and overall development needs. As noted in Annex I, the methodology does not take account of the specific structure (e.g. fragmentation of the chain, number of smallholder farmers) of the sectors concerned, or the regulatory context of specific countries, both of which are likely to be highly significant in terms of managing the traceability and legal requirements of the EUDR. Nevertheless, the map in Figure 2 provides a snapshot of those sectors and origins that may be most sensitive to the transition required by the EUDR. Further detail is provided in Table 2.

Four of the five agri-food deforestation products (all but cattle) feature in the list, indicating that while attention may focus on the largest agri-food deforestation exports – cocoa and coffee – smaller sectors may be highly economically and socially significant for the countries concerned. Further details of the countries expected to be most affected in each sector are included in Annex IV.


Table 3: Twenty agri-food deforestation products across Africa potentially most affected by the EUDR. Source: COLEAD based on CEPII BACI, IFPRI, Eurostat, and UK Trade Info

| Country | Sector | Product Regulatory Impact Indicator (RII) | Volume exported to EU27 in 2022 (tonnes) | Value exported to EU27 in 2022 (thousand Euros) | Share of global exports destined for the EU market (%) ¹ |
|-----------------------|----------|---|--|---|---|
| Côte d'Ivoire | Cocoa | 692 | 1,166,079 | 2,972,365 | 50.6 |
| São Tomé and Príncipe | Cocoa | 506 | 3,509 | 11,371 | 95.6 |
| Burundi | Coffee | 406 | 4,756 | 22,649 | 50.3 |
| Cameroon | Cocoa | 322 | 235,294 | 518,395 | 69.5 |
| Sierra Leone | Cocoa | 276 | 15,505 | 40,656 | 99.4 |
| Ethiopia | Coffee | 263 | 92,744 | 461,091 | 25.6 |
| Uganda | Coffee | 260 | 214,653 | 545,018 | 56.0 |
| São Tomé and Príncipe | Palm oil | 253 | 4,050 | 6,070 | 75.9 |
| Ghana | Cocoa | 173 | 392,390 | 1,068,802 | 45.8 |
| Liberia | Cocoa | 92 | 13,085 | 28,676 | 64.5 |
| Liberia | Palm oil | 83 | 37,457 | 46,927 | 31.8 |
| Rwanda | Coffee | 59 | 7,789 | 40,668 | 34.1 |
| Togo | Soy | 57 | 120,578 | 102,357 | 28.9 |
| Kenya | Coffee | 39 | 21,360 | 137,040 | 37.2 |
| Nigeria | Cocoa | 36 | 162,236 | 378,819 | 56.0 |
| Tanzania | Coffee | 31 | 35,497 | 106,150 | 37.0 |
| Sierra Leone | Palm oil | 30 | 9,355 | 8,580 | 23.8 |
| Djibouti | Coffee | 24 | 672 | 3,708 | 18.7 |
| Madagascar | Cocoa | 23 | 6,920 | 20,652 | 49.4 |
| Togo | Cocoa | 16 | 4,618 | 10,501 | 62.8 |

¹ This share of EU trade based on prices may be overestimated as EU trade statistics include international transport and insurance costs within prices, while this is not reflected in prices to other world destinations. The potential overstatement of trade through these factors has been estimated at 9%. See UNCTAD (2022) [Developing a global transport costs dataset for international trade](#). UNCTAD Research Paper No. 85.




Figure 2: Twenty agri-food deforestation products across Africa potentially most affected by the EUDR. Colour reflects country Regulatory Impact Indicator (RII), i.e. overall sensitivity to EU regulatory change (see Annex II). Source: COLEAD based on CEPII BACI, IFPRI, Eurostat, and UK Trade Info





The AGRINFO RIA methodology is designed for the analysis of agri-food sectors (the scope of the AGRINFO programme), and therefore cannot be applied directly to non-food **deforestation products**. Nevertheless, to provide some perspective on the significance of timber and rubber, a comparison with agri-food products is instructive. Particular attention should be paid to the six countries whose exports of timber and rubber represent a significant portion of their overall goods trade. For timber, these are the Central African Republic (constituting 34% of all goods exports to the EU), Gabon (20%), Congo (10%), and Cameroon (9%); for rubber, they are Côte d'Ivoire (11%) and Liberia (6%). The relative value of these exports when compared to agri-food exports is provided in Figure 3. In the case of the Central African Republic, only non-agri-food deforestation products are exported.

Figure 3: Countries with the largest exports to the EU27 of rubber and timber; comparison of the value of agri-food and non-agri-food exports. Source: COLEAD based on Eurostat






2.3. The significance of the EU market for African deforestation products

The EUDR's ambition of demonstrating that products have not contributed to deforestation will require the introduction of traceability and product segregation, a significant adjustment in many contexts worldwide. Ensuring that these requirements are met, and that trade to the EU can continue, could be particularly challenging in Africa due to both the EU's heavy reliance on the African continent as a source of certain raw materials, and the EU market's significance for African exporters compared to other trade destinations.

Combined, agri-food deforestation products constitute 25% of all agri-food exports from Africa to the EU market (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: Deforestation products as a share of Africa's agri-food trade with the EU27 (2020–2022 average volume). Source: COLEAD based on Eurostat




For cocoa, the EU and Africa are in a relationship of mutual dependence. The EU depends on Africa for 79% of its cocoa product supply (see Table 4), and 53% of African exports are destined for the EU. In other sectors, the EU is considerably less dependent on Africa: coffee, the second largest sector, meets just 14% of the EU's coffee demands. However, Africa is almost as reliant on the EU coffee market as for cocoa, with 46% of African's current global coffee exports being traded with the EU. A similar asymmetrical relationship faces the palm oil and soy sectors. EU imports from Africa represent less than 2% of total EU imports, but these constitute a significant share of Africa's global trade in both palm oil (13%) and soy (16%). The EU's limited reliance on Africa in these sectors feeds fears that expansion of trade with other existing non-African origins may be more viable than the investment required to meet the EUDR requirements and maintain existing EU–Africa trade in these products.



Table 4: Share of EU imports of deforestation products originating in Africa (2020–2022 average volume).
 Source: COLEAD based on Eurostat

| Deforestation product | Of African origin (%) | Of non-African origin (%) |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|
| Cattle | 3.4 | 96.6 |
| Cocoa | 78.6 | 21.4 |
| Coffee | 13.6 | 86.4 |
| Palm oil | 1.9 | 98.1 |
| Rubber | 9.5 | 90.5 |
| Soy | 0.8 | 99.2 |
| Timber | 2.3 | 97.7 |


Figure 5: Share of African exports of agri-food deforestation products to EU and non-EU markets (2020–2022 average volume). Source: COLEAD based on Eurostat, CEPII BACI, IFPRI, UK Trade Info, and UN



Trade in deforestation products between Africa and the EU fluctuates over time due to variations in both supply (reflecting seasonal variations in environmental conditions) and demand (newly emerging non-EU markets, volatile market prices). The share of trade destined for the EU has slightly reduced in recent years as demand in emerging export markets (such as India and China) has expanded, but this has not significantly disrupted longer-term patterns of trade with the EU (see Figure 6).



Figure 6: Dependence of African exports of agri-food deforestation products on the EU as destination market compared to other destinations, 2020–2022 average in volume. Source: COLEAD based on Eurostat



Trade diversification to other non-EU markets remains a strategy for those countries that cannot meet the new EUDR requirements in the short or longer term. The expected orientation of EU trade in deforestation products towards those origins where the new requirements can most easily be met is likely to stimulate demand in other markets. However, for certain sectors and countries, dependence on the EU market is considerably more significant than may be apparent from the overall picture provided by Figures 5 and 6. Among the 20 countries with the most vulnerable sectors identified by the RIA methodology (Table 3), 10 send more than 50% of their exports to the EU, with some almost entirely dependent on the EU market. Most notably, 96% of São Tomé and Príncipe’s cocoa exports and 76% of its palm oil exports are to the EU market. Sierra Leone (99% of exports) and Cameroon (70%) are similarly dependent on EU cocoa demand. This raises questions about the possibilities and consequences of shifting trade flows, particularly in the short term.

Certain countries may face multiple challenges due to exports of several deforestation products, although for some countries trade in single products may be more significant than cumulated exports in others. To provide a sense of the broader economic significance of this trade, Table 5 indicates the significance of exports in deforestation products combined in terms of each country’s GDP. For nine countries, trade in deforestation products with the EU represents more than 1% of GDP, the largest economic imprint being on Côte d’Ivoire (5.7%). As a point of comparison, France’s total global agricultural products exports (all products and all markets) represent 4.4% of France’s GDP.²

² Source: COLEAD based on the World Bank and Eurostat.



Table 2: Countries with trade value in deforestation products $\geq 0.01\%$ GDP (2020–2022 average). Source: COLEAD based on Eurostat, CEPII BACI, IFPRI, UK Trade Info, and World Bank

| Country | Deforestation product exports value (US\$) | GDP (US\$) | Exports of deforestation products as share of GDP (%) |
|--------------------------|--|-----------------|---|
| Côte d'Ivoire | 3,899,687,781 | 68,270,853,114 | 5.71 |
| Liberia | 104,526,983 | 3,516,676,550 | 2.97 |
| São Tomé and Príncipe | 14,875,280 | 515,295,052 | 2.89 |
| Cameroon | 889,826,889 | 43,484,391,036 | 2.05 |
| Ghana | 1,312,939,354 | 74,012,767,900 | 1.77 |
| Gabon | 300,616,694 | 18,868,087,772 | 1.59 |
| Sierra Leone | 52,362,147 | 4,094,161,597 | 1.28 |
| Uganda | 459,602,291 | 41,224,957,876 | 1.11 |
| Togo | 82,254,508 | 7,949,938,786 | 1.03 |
| Burundi | 25,411,655 | 2,832,964,545 | 0.90 |
| Congo | 111,683,433 | 12,821,638,042 | 0.87 |
| Central African Republic | 13,015,570 | 2,408,612,643 | 0.54 |
| Namibia | 59,218,501 | 11,879,158,863 | 0.50 |
| Tunisia | 220,311,493 | 45,296,903,446 | 0.49 |
| Guinea | 63,972,747 | 17,165,801,024 | 0.37 |
| Morocco | 480,904,586 | 132,798,568,181 | 0.36 |
| Ethiopia | 361,056,246 | 115,234,363,269 | 0.31 |
| Rwanda | 34,114,908 | 11,513,667,969 | 0.30 |
| Madagascar | 26,264,493 | 14,187,054,308 | 0.19 |
| Tanzania | 101,348,233 | 70,811,218,318 | 0.14 |
| Nigeria | 622,843,168 | 450,139,546,877 | 0.14 |
| Congo (Dem. Rep.) | 68,254,802 | 54,044,628,010 | 0.13 |
| Kenya | 121,095,566 | 107,927,057,697 | 0.11 |
| Saint Helena | 52,316 | 50,230,133 | 0.10 |
| Mauritius | 8,304,768 | 11,925,260,563 | 0.07 |
| South Africa | 249,866,524 | 387,501,641,366 | 0.06 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 7,018,193 | 11,394,153,279 | 0.06 |
| Djibouti | 1,774,601 | 3,356,155,897 | 0.05 |
| Mozambique | 7,947,573 | 15,928,371,255 | 0.05 |
| Benin | 7,985,360 | 16,914,458,346 | 0.05 |
| Egypt | 165,591,583 | 428,412,442,456 | 0.04 |
| Burkina Faso | 5,170,123 | 18,851,947,276 | 0.03 |
| Zambia | 6,106,184 | 23,347,580,748 | 0.03 |
| Botswana | 2,881,990 | 18,016,560,002 | 0.02 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 216,159 | 1,567,944,977 | 0.01 |
| Malawi | 1,671,074 | 12,607,703,510 | 0.01 |
| Algeria | 20,800,747 | 167,042,948,498 | 0.01 |
| Seychelles | 142,588 | 1,352,869,917 | 0.01 |
| Angola | 6,474,622 | 74,213,474,027 | 0.01 |
| Comoros | 66,202 | 1,254,549,361 | 0.01 |



3. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This report provides a snapshot of trade in deforestation products between Africa and the EU. Using a methodology combining trade and development indicators, it points to those countries and sectors that may be most affected by changes to regulations in general, including new requirements set out by the EUDR.

The significance of certain sectors and countries such as the cocoa trade from Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Cameroon are widely recognised and have been targeted for specific EU support and assistance ([EU Sustainable Cocoa Initiative](#)). This report complements this approach by identifying other countries whose trade in deforestation products is less significant in terms of quantity of trade, but nevertheless may be highly affected by the EUDR due to dependence on the export revenue from the products concerned and overall development needs. In particular, this report highlights that:

- while cocoa and coffee dominate Africa–EU trade in agrifood deforestation products, exports of palm oil (Liberia, Sierra Leone, São Tomé and Príncipe) and soy (Togo) are also extremely sensitive for the countries concerned
- countries whose exports may be relatively insignificant from the perspective of overall EU trade in these products may nevertheless be highly dependent upon such trade. This includes Burundi (coffee), Liberia (cocoa, palm oil), Sierra Leone (cocoa, palm oil), São Tomé and Príncipe (cocoa, palm oil), Togo (soy), and Uganda (coffee).



4. ANNEXES

4.1. Annex I: Regulatory Impact Assessment methodology

How to identify agricultural sectors particularly sensitive to EU regulatory change?

The simplest way to identify regulatory impact is to focus on those countries with the greatest trade with the EU. If an EU regulatory change has an impact on, for example, bananas, it is likely that the overall implications in terms of trade and number of operators affected (producers, processors, exporters) would be greatest in those countries exporting the highest volume of bananas to the EU. However, such an analysis gives only a limited picture as it does not take into account the relative importance of that trade for an individual country. In many cases, exports of a given product may be comparatively small in volume, but can be of crucial social and economic significance for the country concerned.

To identify trading partners that are most vulnerable to regulatory change, an approach is needed that focuses on the significance of agri-food trade from the perspective of the exporting country.

With this goal in mind, the AGRINFO programme has developed the RIA methodology based on two premises:

- **Limited trade diversification indicates economic vulnerability:** Where a country is reliant on a small number of export destination markets, its export revenue is vulnerable to sudden changes in demand and price volatility. Diversifying trade helps to reduce a country's exposure to shocks that can have a negative impact throughout the national economy.³ Two elements of trade diversification are captured in the RIA methodology:
 - *product export diversification (PED):* the extent to which a country is dependent on its agri-food trade with the EU (ratio of agri-food exports to the EU/total goods exports to the EU)
 - *geographical export diversification (GED):* the extent to which a country is dependent on its trade *with the EU* compared to other export destinations (goods exports to the EU/global exports in goods).

The trade data used in this analysis are drawn from multiple sources, including CEPII BACI, IFPRI, Eurostat, UK Trade Info, and country-level National Statistics Offices.⁴ The products considered as “agri-food” are those included in the Harmonised System of the World Customs Organisation (HS 1–23).⁵ The products are considered at a six-digit level.⁶

³ WTO, [World Trade Report 2021 – Economic Resilience and Trade](#).

⁴ The [COLEAD Market Insights](#) data warehouse has been built over the years across multiple programmes managed by COLEAD. Data are continually cross-checked and updated, and have been compiled and triangulated using these various data sources.

⁵ These HS chapters also include certain non-food products, e.g. plants and flowers. For simplicity, these are included in the definition of agri-food products, for example when considering a product's share of overall agri-food trade. However, these products are not highlighted in the maps or tables as they are not affected by food policy.

⁶ The six-digit classifications evolve over time. In this database, the 2002 HS system is used as a fixed reference point to ensure continuity in the data to allow analysis over time. The conversion table used to convert emerging HS classifications back to the 2002 reference point comes from the United Nations Statistics Division: <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/classifications/Econ>. For example, the conversion from 2022 to 2002 can be found [here](#) [direct download].



The trade data in this report are based on average exports over a period of 3 years (2020–2022) unless specified otherwise.

- **Countries that are socially and economically vulnerable are less well-equipped to adjust to changing EU rules:** Low- and middle-income countries, and particularly least developed countries, may face difficulties in implementing policy and legal changes due to limited economic and human resources. The World Trade Organization reflects this by allowing longer transition periods for treaty implementation for least developed countries as part of special and differential treatment. The United Nations has developed social and economic indices to reflect these characteristics, which are commonly used by the European Commission in setting its development priorities (e.g. the European Development Fund):
 - the *UN Economic and Environmental Vulnerability Index (EVI)*⁷ is a single figure derived from eight indicators⁸ that capture the overall economic profile of the country
 - the *UN Human Assets Index (HAI)*⁹ is a measure of a country's human capital, compiling six indicators¹⁰ that reflect a country's potential for sustainable development.

The RIA methodology used in this report combines these trade and socio-economic indicators to derive an overall measure of the potential impact of changing rules on a given country. Assuming that the countries most dependent on trade and with the greatest development needs will be the most sensitive to regulatory change, this methodology establishes a Regulatory Impact Indicator (RII) for each country as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Country RII} &= \text{socio-economic indicator} \times \text{dependence on trade indicator} \\ &= [\text{EVI} + (1 - \text{HAI})]/2 \times (\text{PED} \times \text{GED} \times 100)\end{aligned}$$

High development needs are indicated by a high EVI, but by a low HAI. The HAI is inverted in order to be able to combine these two indicators. The dependence on trade indicator is multiplied by 100 to bring that indicator into the same order of magnitude as the socio-economic indicator, to provide comparable weighting between the two.

An example of this calculation is set out in Annex II.

For individual products, a product RII is constructed by applying the percentage of that product's portion of a country's overall exports – a further indicator of export diversification – to the country RII. So, for example, if a country's banana exports represent 50% of its total agricultural exports:

$$\text{banana RII} = \text{country RII} \times 50\%$$

⁷ <https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category/evi-indicators-ldc.html>

⁸ Share of agricultural, forestry, and fishing GDP, share of population in low elevated coastal zones, remoteness and whether landlocked, stability of agricultural production, instability of exports of goods and services, victims of disasters.

⁹ The data used during the development of the methodology was the 2021 triennial review dataset: <https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/least-developed-country-category/ldc-data-retrieval.html>

¹⁰ The six indicators are: under-five mortality rate, prevalence of stunting, maternal mortality ratio, secondary school enrolment ratio, adult literacy rate, and gender parity rate index for secondary school enrolment.



The tables in Annex IV list the products that were found to be most sensitive (most vulnerable to regulatory change) for each region. These show the country; product; product RII; compound annual growth rate (CAGR)¹¹ in volume from 2013 to 2022 (unless otherwise specified); and indices relating to product and geographical export diversification.

Limits of the methodology

Some limitations to this methodological approach are recognised. The evaluation of trade diversification only takes into account existing trade. There may be emerging markets in particular products that have considerable growth potential, but whose recent trade is not yet large enough to be captured in the analysis. This approach treats all product sectors within a country equally, while in practice some agri-food sectors are likely to have been targeted for specific public and private investment that leaves them better at adjusting to changing regulatory demands. Finally, the data do not take into account the specific organisational structure of the value chains analysed; for example, the number of smallholders involved in the chain. Such factors may be significant in terms of a value chain's ability to adapt to changing EU regulatory requirements.

Nevertheless, this methodology provides a clear snapshot of the relevant importance (and vulnerability) of agricultural exports to the EU from specific countries and sectors.

¹¹ CAGR accounts for compounding effect, offering a more accurate reflection of evolution over time, and smoothing out fluctuations. It provides a nuanced understanding of growth trends ([Investopedia, 2023](#)).



4.2. Annex II: Example of Regulatory Impact Indicator calculation

Country RII = socio-economic indicator x dependence on trade indicator

$$= [EVI + (1 - HAI)]/2 \times (PED \times GED \times 100)$$

Algeria

| UN Economic Vulnerability Index | UN Human Assets Index adjusted (1 - HAI) | Product export diversification (Agri-food exports to EU27 / Total exports to EU27) | Geographic export diversification (Total exports to EU27 / Total exports to the world) |
|---------------------------------|--|---|---|
| EVI = 30.8 | 1 - HAI = 9.8 | PED = 0.061 | GED = 0.25 |

$$= (30.8 + 9.8)/2 \times (0.0061 \times 0.86 \times 100) = 20.3 \times 0.52$$

$$= 11$$



4.3. Annex III: Regulatory Impact Indicators per country

| Country | Agri-trade RII | Agri-food exports to EU27 / Total exports to EU27 (%) | Total exports to EU27 / Total exports to the world (%) | UN Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI) | UN Human Assets Index adjusted (1 – HAI) |
|--------------------------|----------------|---|--|---------------------------------------|--|
| Algeria | 11 | 1 | 86 | 30.8 | 9.8 |
| Angola | 5 | 1 | 18 | 45.6 | 48.0 |
| Benin | 36 | 65 | 1 | 33.0 | 50.6 |
| Botswana | 2 | 0 | 17 | 50.9 | 16.9 |
| Burkina Faso | 32 | 53 | 1 | 48.6 | 44.0 |
| Burundi | 412 | 87 | 11 | 38.7 | 46.1 |
| Cabo Verde | 1453 | 79 | 76 | 39.9 | 8.8 |
| Cameroon | 436 | 28 | 51 | 23.4 | 38.8 |
| Central African Republic | 17 | 2 | 22 | 27.7 | 72.6 |
| Chad | 36 | 1 | 54 | 51.8 | 81.7 |
| Comoros | 339 | 35 | 27 | 37.7 | 32.8 |
| Congo | 6 | 2 | 11 | 24.9 | 31.3 |
| Congo (Dem. Rep.) | 10 | 4 | 7 | 28.3 | 52.1 |
| Côte D'ivoire | 823 | 83 | 30 | 19.9 | 47.0 |
| Djibouti | 46 | 44 | 2 | 53.9 | 38.1 |
| Egypt | 46 | 11 | 25 | 16.1 | 16.7 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 1 | 0 | 41 | 18.7 | 32.9 |
| Eritrea | 1 | 2 | 1 | 50.2 | 42.8 |
| Eswatini | 63 | 84 | 2 | 37.3 | 22.9 |
| Ethiopia | 474 | 83 | 14 | 34.3 | 44.7 |
| Gabon | 14 | 3 | 19 | 25.5 | 21.5 |
| Gambia | 230 | 91 | 6 | 51.3 | 36.2 |
| Ghana | 219 | 68 | 13 | 27.9 | 21.5 |
| Guinea | 15 | 7 | 5 | 28.8 | 60.2 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 72 | 75 | 2 | 41.0 | 56.0 |
| Kenya | 384 | 90 | 14 | 33.4 | 26.8 |
| Lesotho | 12 | 1 | 24 | 43.4 | 37.4 |
| Liberia | 176 | 8 | 47 | 40.2 | 54.8 |
| Libya | 2 | 0 | 81 | 37.3 | 16.4 |
| Madagascar | 593 | 52 | 31 | 34.8 | 39.3 |
| Malawi | 144 | 15 | 22 | 44.5 | 44.5 |
| Mali | 10 | 51 | 0 | 49.3 | 54.4 |
| Mauritania | 359 | 54 | 15 | 45.2 | 45.9 |
| Mauritius | 186 | 55 | 24 | 22.4 | 5.9 |
| Morocco | 296 | 24 | 54 | 29.8 | 16.9 |
| Mozambique | 43 | 4 | 25 | 41.4 | 46.1 |
| Namibia | 185 | 31 | 21 | 39.2 | 16.5 |
| Niger | 4 | 2 | 3 | 48.5 | 64.4 |
| Nigeria | 53 | 3 | 36 | 36.6 | 56.5 |
| Rwanda | 87 | 61 | 4 | 32.3 | 32.4 |
| Saint Helena | 33 | 24 | 8 | 30.3 | 3.9 |
| São Tomé and Príncipe | 802 | 95 | 46 | 25.8 | 10.6 |
| Senegal | 223 | 66 | 9 | 43.0 | 33.6 |
| Sierra Leone | 323 | 19 | 34 | 40.3 | 58.3 |
| Somalia | 294 | 89 | 5 | 51.9 | 75.7 |
| South Africa | 44 | 12 | 16 | 33.2 | 13.8 |
| South Sudan | 1 | 0 | 10 | 54.6 | 78.0 |
| Sudan | 69 | 29 | 6 | 37.9 | 38.1 |
| Tanzania | 87 | 36 | 6 | 34.7 | 38.9 |
| Togo | 95 | 65 | 5 | 23.3 | 41.2 |
| Tunisia | 100 | 8 | 69 | 27.9 | 9.2 |
| Uganda | 377 | 96 | 11 | 29.1 | 42.2 |
| Zambia | 7 | 8 | 3 | 41.7 | 32.9 |
| Zimbabwe | 39 | 15 | 7 | 49.3 | 29.6 |



4.4. Annex IV: Relative Regulatory Impact of the EUDR per sector in Africa

The tables below provide further data on each deforestation product, ranking countries according to the RIA methodology in the case of agri-food products, and according to volume of trade for non-agri-food products. An average annual trade value of €100,000 is used as a cut-off criterion for inclusion of a sector in the tables, with the exception of non-agri-food palm oil (for which all trade is below this figure).

4.4.1. Cattle

Table 3: Countries exporting cattle-related deforestation products (agri-food) most sensitive to regulatory change (including countries whose exports' value exceeds €100,000)

| Country | Product Regulatory Impact Indicator (RII) | Compound annual growth rate (CAGR ¹²) 2013–2022, volume (%) | Share of product in agri-food exports to EU27, 2020–2022 average value (%) | Volume exported to EU27 in 2022 (tonnes) | Value exported to EU27 in 2022 (thousand Euros) | Share of global cattle exports destined for EU market ¹³ (%) |
|---------------|---|---|--|--|---|---|
| Côte d'Ivoire | 692 | 4.0 | 84.1 | 1,166,079 | 2,972,365 | 50.6 |
| Namibia | 6 | 5.6 | 3.2 | 3,974 | 24,536 | 11.0 |
| Botswana | 1.3 | 1.6 | 83.6 | 714 | 3,405 | 2.2 |
| Algeria | 0.04 | – ¹⁴ | 0.4 | 462 | 1,822 | 60.7 |

Source: COLEAD based on Eurostat, CEPII BACI, IFPRI, UK Trade Info, and UN.

Table 4: Countries exporting cattle-related deforestation products (non-agri-food) (including countries whose exports' value exceeds €100,000)

| Country | Compound annual growth rate (CAGR) 2013–2022, volume (%) | Share of product in total exports to EU27, 2020–2022 average value (%) | Volume exported to EU27 in 2022 (tonnes) | Value exported to EU27 in 2022 (thousand Euros) | Share of global cattle product exports destined for EU market ¹⁵ (%) |
|--------------|--|--|--|---|---|
| South Africa | 1.1 | 0.2 | 10,509 | 53,710 | 36.5 |
| Kenya | –7.5 | 0.6 | 6,217 | 9,628 | 42.9 |
| Morocco | 3.6 | 0.1 | 2,755 | 23,664 | 91.8 |
| Egypt | –9.1 | 0.3 | 2,450 | 32,314 | 34.4 |
| Algeria | –3.6 | 0.0 | 1,585 | 3,020 | 60.6 |
| Tunisia | –8.3 | 0.0 | 1,157 | 2,874 | 54.6 |
| Namibia | –13.9 | 0.1 | 587 | 1,009 | 9.9 |
| Uganda | –4.6 | 0.1 | 476 | 758 | 11.6 |

Source: COLEAD based on Eurostat, CEPII BACI, IFPRI, UK Trade Info, and UN.

¹² CAGR, compound annual growth rate = $\left(\frac{\text{Volume 2022}}{\text{Volume 2013}}\right)^{\frac{1}{2022-2013}} - 1$

¹³ See footnote 1.

¹⁴ Not enough trade recorded to calculate growth.

¹⁵ See footnote 1.



4.4.2. Cocoa

Table 5: Cocoa-exporting countries most sensitive to regulatory change (including countries whose exports' value exceeds €100,000)

| Country | Product Regulatory Impact Indicator (RII) | Compound annual growth rate (CAGR) 2013–2022, volume (%) | Share of product in agri-food exports to EU27, 2020–2022 average value (%) | Volume exported to EU27 in 2022 (tonnes) | Value exported to EU27 in 2022 (thousand Euros) | Share of global cocoa exports destined for EU market ¹⁶ (%) |
|-----------------------|---|--|--|--|---|--|
| Côte d'Ivoire | 692 | 4.0 | 84.1 | 1,166,079 | 2,972,365 | 50.6 |
| São Tomé and Príncipe | 506 | 6.2 | 63.1 | 3,509 | 11,371 | 95.6 |
| Cameroon | 322 | 3.5 | 73.8 | 235,294 | 518,395 | 69.5 |
| Sierra Leone | 276 | 6.0 | 85.4 | 15,505 | 40,656 | 99.4 |
| Ghana | 173 | -0.4 | 78.7 | 392,390 | 1,068,802 | 45.8 |
| Liberia | 92 | 7.7 | 52.3 | 13,085 | 28,676 | 64.5 |
| Nigeria | 36 | -0.8 | 68.5 | 162,236 | 378,819 | 56.0 |
| Madagascar | 23 | 3.8 | 3.9 | 6,920 | 20,652 | 49.4 |
| Togo | 16 | -7.8 | 17.3 | 4,618 | 10,501 | 62.8 |
| Uganda | 16 | -2.6 | 4.3 | 9,245 | 24,690 | 24.3 |
| Guinea | 13 | 17.2 | 86.6 | 19,119 | 40,183 | 57.3 |
| Congo (Dem. Rep.) | 5.5 | 30.8 | 54.8 | 12,748 | 32,297 | 27.1 |
| Tanzania | 3.4 | -6.2 | 3.9 | 2,023 | 5,561 | 23.1 |
| Congo | 2.1 | -8.1 | 37.6 | 2,160 | 3,887 | 15.5 |
| Equatorial Guinea | 0.9 | 4.5 | 95.9 | 883 | 1,851 | 87.2 |
| Algeria | 0.4 | -2.2 | 3.3 | 862 | 3,563 | 81.2 |
| Kenya | 0.3 | -0.9 | 0.1 | 211 | 481 | 4.6 |
| Egypt | 0.0 | 27.0 | 0.1 | 237 | 1,192 | 0.4 |
| Libya | 0.0 | 54.5 | 1.1 | 249 | 518 | 66.1 |
| Morocco | 0.0 | 30.6 | 0.0 | 168 | 616 | 6.5 |
| Tunisia | 0.0 | 65.1 | 0.0 | 32 | 153 | 2.0 |
| South Africa | 0.0 | 3.7 | 0.0 | 127 | 792 | 0.9 |

Source: COLEAD based on Eurostat, CEPII BACI, IFPRI, UK Trade Info, and UN.

¹⁶ See footnote 1.



4.4.3. Coffee

Table 6: Coffee-exporting countries most sensitive to regulatory change (including countries whose exports' value exceeds €100,000)

| Country | Product Regulatory Impact Indicator (RII) | Compound annual growth rate (CAGR) 2013–2022, volume (%) | Share of product in agri-food exports to EU27, 2020–2022 average value (%) | Volume exported to EU27 in 2022 (tonnes) | Value exported to EU27 in 2022 (thousand Euros) | Share of global coffee exports destined for EU market ¹⁷ (%) |
|-------------------|---|--|--|--|---|---|
| Burundi | 406 | -8.5 | 98.6 | 4,756 | 22,649 | 50.3 |
| Ethiopia | 263 | 1.1 | 55.5 | 92,744 | 461,091 | 25.6 |
| Uganda | 260 | 5.5 | 68.9 | 214,653 | 545,018 | 56.0 |
| Rwanda | 59 | -1.4 | 68.0 | 7,789 | 40,668 | 34.1 |
| Kenya | 39 | -2.8 | 10.2 | 21,360 | 137,040 | 37.2 |
| Tanzania | 31 | 0.3 | 35.4 | 35,497 | 106,150 | 37.0 |
| Djibouti | 24 | 1.9 | 52.8 | 672 | 3,708 | 18.7 |
| Sierra Leone | 15 | -6.3 | 4.5 | 1,328 | 2,760 | 46.7 |
| Cameroon | 14 | -7.6 | 3.3 | 9,748 | 22,861 | 69.1 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 6.6 | -5.1 | 0.8 | 13,165 | 29,687 | 29.3 |
| Malawi | 6.2 | -7.2 | 4.3 | 369 | 1,991 | 44.0 |
| Congo (Dem. Rep.) | 3.4 | 8.4 | 33.7 | 6,519 | 27,946 | 63.7 |
| Congo | 2.9 | -4.7 | 51.7 | 2,585 | 8,636 | 68.2 |
| Togo | 2.3 | -13.3 | 2.4 | 2,051 | 4,325 | 30.1 |
| Zambia | 1.45 | 11.9 | 19.7 | 1,418 | 7,951 | 37.2 |
| Guinea | 0.90 | 9.4 | 6.1 | 3,160 | 6,675 | 15.8 |
| Angola | 0.18 | 9.2 | 3.4 | 526 | 1,153 | 69.0 |
| Senegal | 0.14 | 12.2 | 0.1 | 40 | 163 | 64.3 |
| Zimbabwe | 0.12 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 53 | 303 | 8.8 |

Source: COLEAD based on Eurostat, CEPII BACI, IFPRI, UK Trade Info, and UN.

¹⁷ See footnote 1.



4.4.4. Palm oil

Table 7: Palm oil-exporting countries (agri-food) most sensitive to regulatory change (including countries whose exports' value exceeds €100,000). *CAGR calculated for 2014–2022

| Country | Product Regulatory Impact Indicator (RII) | Compound annual growth rate (CAGR) 2013–2022, volume (%) | Share of product in agri-food exports to EU27, 2020–2022 average value (%) | Volume exported to EU27 in 2022 (tonnes) | Value exported to EU27 in 2022 (thousand Euros) | Share of global palm oil exports destined for EU market ¹⁸ (%) |
|-----------------------|---|--|--|--|---|---|
| São Tomé and Príncipe | 253 | – ¹⁹ | 31.5 | 4,050 | 6,070 | 75.9 |
| Liberia | 83 | 85.2 | 47.4 | 37,457 | 46,927 | 31.8 |
| Sierra Leone | 30 | *19.0 | 9.2 | 9,355 | 8,580 | 23.8 |
| Gabon | 14 | 57.0 | 98.7 | 43,423 | 56,782 | 56.9 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 14 | 5.9 | 1.7 | 83,463 | 91,525 | 13.7 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 4.5 | 43.4 | 6.3 | 351 | 533 | 95.7 |
| Cameroon | 2.4 | 16.3 | 0.5 | 2,397 | 4,773 | 40.9 |
| Ghana | 1.8 | 3.2 | 0.8 | 16,102 | 17,746 | 10.5 |
| Guinea | 0.52 | 11.0 | 3.5 | 1,459 | 2,285 | 13.8 |
| Nigeria | 0.35 | –11.3 | 0.7 | 6,608 | 12,149 | 27.3 |
| Egypt | 0.05 | –8.2 | 0.1 | 1,170 | 1,902 | 5.3 |
| Tunisia | 0.02 | *19.3 | 0.0 | 1,378 | 250 | 91.2 |
| Algeria | 0.00 | – ²⁰ | 0.0 | 157 | 197 | 7.5 |
| South Africa | 0.00 | 37.3 | 0.0 | 5 | 161 | 0.3 |

Source: COLEAD based on Eurostat, CEPII BACI, IFPRI, UK Trade Info, and UN.

Table 8: Palm oil-exporting countries (non-agri-food) most sensitive to regulatory change

| Country | Compound annual growth rate (CAGR) 2013–2022, volume (%) | Share of product in total exports to EU27, 2020–2022 average value (%) | Volume exported to EU27 in 2022 (tonnes) | Value exported to EU27 in 2022 (thousand Euros) | Share of global palm oil exports destined for EU market ²¹ (%) |
|-----------------------|--|--|--|---|---|
| São Tomé and Príncipe | – ²² | 0.1 | 254 | 60 | 100.0 |
| Egypt | 29.2 | 0.0 | 2 | 6 | 2.6 |
| South Africa | –19.3 | 0.0 | 3 | 3 | 0.1 |
| Mauritius | –2.0 | 0.0 | 0 | 1 | 0.8 |

Source: COLEAD based on Eurostat, CEPII BACI, IFPRI, UK Trade Info, and UN.

¹⁸ See footnote 1.

¹⁹ Not enough trade recorded to calculate growth.

²⁰ Not enough trade recorded to calculate growth.

²¹ See footnote 1.

²² Not enough trade recorded to calculate growth.



4.4.5. Rubber

Table 9: Rubber-exporting countries (non-agri-food) most sensitive to regulatory change (including countries whose exports' value exceeds €100,000)

| Country | Compound annual growth rate (CAGR) 2013–2022, volume (%) | Share of product in total exports to EU27, 2020–2022 average value (%) | Volume exported to EU27 in 2022 (tonnes) | Value exported to EU27 in 2022 (thousand Euros) | Share of global rubber exports destined for EU market ²³ (%) |
|-------------------|--|--|--|---|---|
| Côte d'Ivoire | 8.7 | 10.6 | 332,524 | 590,812 | 26.4 |
| South Africa | 7.2 | 0.3 | 15,115 | 83,598 | 14.0 |
| Egypt | 12.1 | 0.5 | 23,658 | 73,903 | 35.8 |
| Ghana | 10.9 | 1.9 | 33,089 | 62,534 | 25.1 |
| Morocco | 5.6 | 0.3 | 6,434 | 57,207 | 85.5 |
| Liberia | 9.0 | 6.3 | 32,132 | 56,726 | 22.0 |
| Nigeria | 0.2 | 0.2 | 29,077 | 55,362 | 64.3 |
| Cameroon | -0.6 | 1.3 | 30,072 | 52,106 | 50.6 |
| Guinea | 3.1 | 3.0 | 13,632 | 25,576 | 74.1 |
| Tunisia | -6.5 | 0.1 | 626 | 7,387 | 36.3 |
| Gabon | -14.0 | 0.6 | 3,385 | 6,416 | 29.8 |
| Algeria | 42.0 | 0.0 | 814 | 2,719 | 16.2 |
| Mauritius | -2.9 | 0.2 | 38 | 1,175 | 18.1 |
| Congo (Dem. Rep.) | 9.5 | 0.0 | 440 | 661 | 5.1 |
| Senegal | 112.4 | 0.0 | 65 | 348 | 2.4 |
| Congo | -30.2 | 0.0 | 76 | 256 | 7.5 |
| Seychelles | 46.9 | 0.0 | 42 | 144 | 11.4 |
| Angola | 58.3 | 0.0 | 14 | 125 | 6.2 |

Source: COLEAD based on Eurostat, CEPII BACI, IFPRI, UK Trade Info, and UN.

²³ See footnote 1.



4.4.6. Soy

Table 10: Soy-exporting countries most sensitive to regulatory change (including countries whose exports' value exceeds €100,000). *CAGR calculated for 2015–2022; ** CAGR calculated for 2016–2022

| Country | Product Regulatory Impact Indicator (RII) | Compound annual growth rate (CAGR) 2013–2022, volume (%) | Share of product in agri-food exports to EU27, 2020–2022 average value (%) | Volume exported to EU27 in 2022 (tonnes) | Value exported to EU27 in 2022 (thousand Euros) | Share of global soy exports destined for EU market ²⁴ (%) |
|--------------|---|--|--|--|---|--|
| Togo | 57 | 29.7 | 60.1 | 120,578 | 102,357 | 28.9 |
| Benin | 12 | 421.7 | 32.5 | 14,941 | 11,795 | 5.8 |
| Nigeria | 5.8 | **62.1 | 10.9 | 106,347 | 75,149 | 81.5 |
| Ethiopia | 4.5 | **28.5 | 0.9 | 5,840 | 6,298 | 7.1 |
| Uganda | 2.8 | 272.3 | 0.7 | 2,561 | 2,315 | 13.7 |
| Burkina Faso | 2.1 | *16.9 | 6.5 | 8,588 | 7,434 | 20.0 |
| Egypt | 0.26 | *13.7 | 0.6 | 5,845 | 7,953 | 3.0 |
| Ghana | 0.04 | 38.7 | 0.0 | 989 | 661 | 1.0 |
| Morocco | 0.03 | 11.9 | 0.0 | 519 | 868 | 0.7 |

Source: COLEAD based on Eurostat, CEPII BACI, IFPRI, UK Trade Info, and UN.

²⁴ See footnote 1.



4.4.7. Timber

Table 11: Timber-exporting countries (non-agri-food) most sensitive to regulatory change (including countries whose exports' value exceeds €100,000)

| Country | Compound annual growth rate (CAGR) 2013–2022, volume (%) | Share of product in total exports to EU27, 2020–2022 average value (%) | Volume exported to EU27 in 2022 (tonnes) | Value exported to EU27 in 2022 (thousand Euros) | Share of global timber exports destined for EU market ²⁵ (%) |
|--------------------------|--|--|--|---|---|
| Cameroon | 1.4 | 9.3 | 295,653 | 276,027 | 30.3 |
| Côte d'Ivoire | -5.5 | 1.3 | 49,437 | 62,374 | 21.7 |
| Central African Republic | 8.0 | 34.1 | 26,259 | 17,344 | 18.6 |
| Namibia | 25.3 | 3.2 | 116,999 | 57,193 | 37.9 |
| Morocco | 9.5 | 1.9 | 49,845 | 417,512 | 63.9 |
| Ghana | -12.1 | 1.5 | 28,309 | 37,338 | 12.4 |
| Gabon | 5.4 | 20.3 | 278,465 | 297,526 | 27.9 |
| Mauritius | 1.4 | 1.1 | 1,901 | 7,340 | 13.0 |
| Madagascar | 6.4 | 0.3 | 5,117 | 3,518 | 13.7 |
| Tunisia | 11.4 | 1.8 | 39,765 | 256,573 | 46.0 |
| Benin | 14.0 | 4.0 | 2,182 | 1,516 | 2.2 |
| Cabo Verde | 5.4 | 0.1 | 34 | 105 | 1.4 |
| Liberia | -17.5 | 0.3 | 6,125 | 2,602 | 10.8 |
| Congo | -3.5 | 9.6 | 112,991 | 100,892 | 19.3 |
| Senegal | -4.5 | 0.1 | 180 | 670 | 1.5 |
| Egypt | 5.6 | 0.6 | 100,562 | 86,603 | 5.4 |
| South Africa | 2.1 | 0.5 | 237,378 | 133,619 | 3.5 |
| Mozambique | 66.2 | 0.4 | 75,698 | 14,128 | 3.4 |
| Tanzania | 24.6 | 0.2 | 1,696 | 1,906 | 0.6 |
| Kenya | -7.8 | 0.0 | 95 | 571 | 0.3 |
| Sierra Leone | 0.6 | 0.0 | 276 | 256 | 0.1 |
| Ethiopia | 7.9 | 0.0 | 23 | 137 | 2.5 |
| Togo | -14.6 | 0.1 | 36 | 190 | 0.8 |
| Congo (Dem. Rep.) | -9.3 | 1.1 | 26,724 | 24,126 | 9.0 |
| Malawi | 33.8 | 0.0 | 31 | 158 | 0.7 |
| Nigeria | -6.7 | 0.1 | 63,614 | 20,748 | 16.0 |
| Uganda | 55.8 | 0.0 | 93 | 117 | 0.1 |
| Burkina Faso | 0.0 | 0.1 | 37 | 156 | 6.3 |
| Mali | 12.0 | 0.3 | 29 | 179 | 0.2 |
| Zimbabwe | -4.6 | 0.0 | 11 | 247 | 0.2 |
| Angola | 10.0 | 0.1 | 5,548 | 4,697 | 5.3 |
| Algeria | 45.7 | 0.0 | 7,956 | 10,758 | 25.2 |
| Niger | 19.1 | 0.1 | 963 | 132 | 8.4 |
| Equatorial Guinea | -9.8 | 0.3 | 4,134 | 5,072 | 4.0 |

Source: COLEAD based on Eurostat, CEPII BACI, IFPRI, UK Trade Info, and UN.

²⁵ See footnote 1.



GROWING PEOPLE